Should I stay or should I go?

How faulty decision-making can lead to aviation accidents?

On Thanksgiving Day in 2011, a non-instrument-rated private pilot took off from Marion Municipal Airport (MZZ) in Indiana and crashed near the destination, DuPage Airport (DPA) in Illinois. KDPA is the airport that I fly out of. On board, the Cirrus SR20 were the pilot, his two daughters, and the boyfriend of the younger daughter. None of them survived the crash. Based on reported weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident site, the flight encountered instrument meteorological which likely lead to the crash.

On the day of the crash, the National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart, valid at 0900, depicted a low-pressure system over Wisconsin with an occluded front extending southward. The NWS Weather Depiction Chart depicted an extensive area of IFR conditions over northern Illinois. Weather conditions recorded by the KDPA Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) indicated visibility 1-3/4 miles in light rain and mist, overcast clouds at 900 feet AGL. These are very dangerous conditions.

The non-instrument-rated pilot was conducting that day's flight under visual flight rules (VFR) without a flight plan. When the pilot contacted DuPage tower, the controller then informed him that the airport was currently under instrument flight rules (IFR). About 30 seconds later, the pilot told the controller that he had inadvertently flown over the airport. The controller ultimately cleared the flight to land, however, the pilot decided not to land.

After asking the pilot if he was qualified to fly in IFR conditions and learning that the pilot was not, the controller transferred the flight to the radar-equipped approach control facility for further assistance. That controller advised the pilot of several alternate airports in the vicinity that were under VFR conditions. After initially indicating that he would divert to one of those airports, the pilot then told the controller that he did not want to “mess with the weather” and did not want to “get stuck in here,” and he declined to proceed to that airport.

Radar data showed that shortly after the pilot’s radio transmission, the airplane entered a right turn. About a minute later, the plane entered a steep spiral. Witnesses on the ground reported hearing an airplane overhead, but they were not able to see it due to the low cloud cover. They described the sound as similar to an airplane performing aerobatics. The witnesses subsequently observed the airplane below the clouds in a steep, nose-down attitude before it struck the ground. The pilot's decision to continue flight in instrument meteorological conditions while not properly rated or on a flight plan resulted in spatial disorientation and eventual loss of control of the airplane.

Over the few years that I've been a pilot, I’ve canceled several flights, answering the go/no-go question in the negative. Many other flights got rescheduled and were completed, either earlier or later than the original plan. The weather has been the most frequent reason for outright cancellation. Considering we’re talking about hundreds of takeoffs, that’s not a bad record. The go/no-go decision should be a constant question in a pilot’s mind, extending beyond organizing the cockpit for the planned flight and right up to shutting down at the other end.